![a day of infamy a day of infamy](https://pearlharbor.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Roosevelts-Day-of-infamy-Speech.jpg)
That said, had Hitler not decided to break Germany’s non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in mid-1941 in the first place, the point would likely be moot and we could have been looking at a very different world today. Instead, the Red Army was able to focus its attention to the west and repel Germany’s Operation Barbarossa. Japan was less than 40 years removed from a victory over Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, and would have been extremely valuable in diverting Stalin’s attention in a war fought on multiple fronts. With Nazi Germany fighting a war on three fronts in Western Europe, Northern Africa and the emerging Eastern Front against the Russians, Hitler could have benefitted greatly from Japan’s assistance against his Soviet nemesis. The Japanese naval powers at be would fully realize this later on in the war – particularly during the Battle of Midway the following year – but by then it would be far too late. It should have derived just how valuable they were based on their own success.īattleships, while still formidable and offering the most offensive firepower from any modern vessel at the time, were strategically out-dated in comparison to the versatility of carriers and their quicker, further-reaching attack capabilities via aircraft. Another huge aspect of irony in this operation is that Japan carried out the majority of its attack with around 400 aircraft – launched from its six aircraft carriers involved in the assault. carriers were not present at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese Imperial Navy knew this, yet they decided to proceed anyway. Japanese military strategists also put too high of a priority on destroying battleships when they should have focused on America’s three Pacific-stationed aircraft carriers – Lexington, Saratoga and Enterprise. Had it bided its time, further built up its Navy, oil reserves and supply lines, and continued negotiating with the American government to stall any potential military action which many considered imminent based on deteriorating relations between the two since the end of the First World War, Japan would have been in a much better strategic position. Japan’s ‘successful’ pre-emptive attack on the United States – which was still neutral at this point of the Second World War – played a prominent role in it ultimately losing the Pacific Theatre. But, as a Japanese admiral said himself following the attack: “We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war.” How right he was. Logistically it was a complete victory for the Empire of the Sun, which was looking to eliminate its Pacific competition so it could continue to pick off and conquer high-value targets throughout East Asia and Oceania at will with its occupation forces, which for several years prior had been extremely effective in doing so. Japan lost around 55 pilots and less than 10 submarine personnel in the assault. The Americans also lost 200 aircraft, most of which were destroyed on the tarmac before they could be scrambled for defensive means as Japanese fighters and bombers swept over the Hawaiian island of Oahu. Navy casualties including over 2,300 killed, with about 20 vessels sunk or heavily damaged. American personnel and naval losses were staggering – nearly 3,500 U.S. The Japanese surprise attack early that Sunday morning was certainly a success in military terms. 7, 1941, you’d be hard pressed to find anyone who hadn’t heard of Pearl Harbor. Eighty years ago this week one of the best examples of this in modern history came to pass at an American naval base in Hawaii, which at the time was likely unknown to most outside of military circles.
![a day of infamy a day of infamy](https://slidetodoc.com/presentation_image_h/9b69b8f53d191e993f75a987a5b705ab/image-41.jpg)
As you’ve probably noted through past commentaries here on page four, I’m fascinated with the concept of historical irony.